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Abstract
In this paper, we combine the strategic delegation approach of Fershtman-
Judd-Sklivas with contests. The results show that besides a symmetric equi-
librium there also exist asymmetric equilibria in which one owner induces
pure sales maximization to his manager so that all the other ﬁrms drop
out of the market. If merging is allowed on an initial stage, the resulting
merged subgame perfect equilibria show that there is strictly more merging
under contest than under Cournot competition. We also compare our ﬁnd-
ings with the previous results on contest models with delegation and ﬁnd
that the outcomes for the Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas incentive scheme clearly
diﬀer. Especially, in our model we have a prisoner’s-dilemma like situation
where delegation is individually rational for each owner, but all owners are
worse oﬀ compared to non-delegation.
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11 Introduction
In large ﬁrms, especially in public corporations, there is a separation of own-
ership and control. Managerial theories of the ﬁrm and agency theory has
emphasized that this separation leads to ineﬃciencies due to asymmetric in-
formation and diﬀering objectives of managers and owners (e.g., Williamson
1964, Jensen and Meckling 1976, Fama and Jensen 1983). On the other
hand, a growing literature on strategic delegation has highlighted that own-
ers will proﬁt from delegating decisions to managers if delegation serves as a
self-commitment device (Fershtman 1985, Vickers 1985). For example, when
ﬁrms compete against each other, owners may wish their managers to act
more aggressively by putting a positive weight on sales in the managerial
incentive contracts. Here, delegation to a manager may be beneﬁcial for an
owner as without delegation the owner would maximize proﬁts and the other
competitors would expect that the owner will do so.
Strategic delegation games usually consist of two stages — the ﬁrst stage
where managerial compensation is chosen by the owners, and the second stage
where the managers compete in an oligopolistic market against each other.
The previous literature on strategic delegation has focused on Cournot and
Bertrand competition on the second stage (e.g., Fershtman and Judd 1987,
Sklivas 1987). But, in practice, many competitive situations are much bet-
ter described by oligopolistic contests. For example, ﬁr m sh a v et os p e n d
resources in advance to compete for a highly proﬁtable order from a pub-
lic institution or from a private corporation. Or, ﬁrms invest resources for
advertising to obtain large market shares (Schmalensee 1976, 1992)1.I na d -
dition, ﬁrms often compete in R&D contests against each other (e.g., Loury
1979). There are also a lot of litigation contests for brand names or patent
rights between ﬁr m s( e . g . ,W ä r n e r y d2 0 0 0 ) . A saf u r t h e re x a m p l e ,w ec a n
1E.g., according to Scherer (2000) advertising expenditures are very high in the phar-
maceutical industry.
2think of oligopolistic competition in new markets, which often look like a
contest. In such markets, it is important for ﬁr m st oi m p l e m e n tan e wt e c h -
nical standard as a ﬁrst-mover to realize network externalities (Besen and
Farrell 1994). Successful competitors (like Microsoft, for example) can be
labeled contest winners, whereas less successful ﬁrms can be described as
contest losers. Either example characterizes a highly competitive situation
where each ﬁrm has sunk expenditures irrespective of the outcome of the
competition. In these cases, oligopolistic competition is far better modelled
by a contest than by Cournot or Bertrand competition.
The aim of this paper is threefold. First, we want to combine the Fershtman-
Judd-Sklivas approach with contest competition and ask how the optimal in-
centives for managers will look like in this alternative form of oligopoly. In the
models of Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) the owners choose a
linear combination of proﬁts and sales as incentive scheme for their managers.
In case of Cournot competition each owner puts a positive weight on sales,
whereas in the Bertrand model owners prefer negative weights on sales. We
will show that there are parallels but also strong diﬀerences to Cournot and
Bertrand competition. On the one hand, like in the Cournot model a sym-
metric equilibrium exists in which the owners put a positive weight on sales.
On the other hand, in contrast to both Cournot and Bertrand competition,
despite a completely symmetric market structure asymmetric (preemptive)
equilibria exist in which one owner induces pure sales maximization to his
manager so that all the other ﬁrms drop out of the market. As oligopolistic
contests deﬁne a rather strong form of competition there will be also strong
incentives for owners to limit competition by merging. Therefore, we will also
discuss merging in contests with strategic delegation. Interestingly, mergers
have already been discussed for the Cournot model with strategic delegation
(Ziss 2001, Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat 2001) on the one hand, and
for the contest model without strategic delegation (Huck et al. 2001) on the
3other hand. In Section 4 we will contrast our results with the ﬁndings of
these papers
Secondly, the model can be used to explain real market behavior. In the
last years, the markets for gas and electricity and the telecommunication
market have become deregulated in Germany and other European countries.
A sac o n s e q u e n c e ,ac o u p l eo fp r i v a t eﬁrms enter into these markets at the
same time. They use a lot of promotional expenditures to aggressively ﬁght
for market shares. This competitive situation can be best described by a
contest model. Our results show that delegation in contests leads to a sym-
metric equilibrium in which all owners choose a sales-oriented compensation
for their managers to make them highly aggressive (see Proposition 3). By
this, all managers spend immense resources to become the contest winner.
In addition, the theoretical results show that aggressive market behavior is
highest for a small number of competitors (see Eq. (12) of Proposition 3).
This ﬁts quite well with the stylized facts for the deregulated markets which
are only entered by few large competitors. The symmetric equilibrium re-
sult may also be used to explain the excessive spending of ressources by the
so-called dotcom ﬁrms in the last years. In this case, network externalities
become so important that managers are given strong incentives mainly to
care for sales than for proﬁts.
Thirdly, we want to contrast our ﬁndings with the previous models on del-
egation in contests to demonstrate the impact of the Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas
incentive scheme on contest competition. As in the Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas
framework we assume that, on the ﬁrst stage of the game, managers are
given a linear incentive scheme conditional on proﬁts and sales. On the sec-
ond stage, the managers compete in a logit-form contest against each other.2
2We adopt the logit-form contest because it ﬁts best within the industrial organization
context. In addition, all the above cited literature on oligopolistic contests also deal with
the logit-form.
4Delegation in contests has been discussed before by Baik and Kim (1997),
Konrad et al. (1999), Schoonbeek (2000), and Wärneryd (2000). However,
none of the these models discuss the Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas compensation
scheme. Baik and Kim (1997) consider a logit-form contest where players can
delegate their decisions to an agent who is compensated according to his abil-
ity and the contest prize. In contrast to our model, incentive parameters are
exogenously given and the principals diﬀer in their preferences concerning the
winner prize. The ﬁndings of Baik and Kim show that in case of bilateral del-
egation less resources are spent compared to the non-delegation case. Inter-
estingly, our results for the symmetric equilibrium show that the Fershtman-
Judd-Sklivas incentive scheme will result in higher resource choices in case
of delegation.
Konrad et al. (1999) discuss delegation in an all-pay auction. Here, the
agent has to pay an up-front fee to the principal prior to the contest and gets
a ﬁxed remuneration in case of winning where the remuneration is derived
endogenously. Konrad et al. show that both principals gain from delegation,
and that delegation contracts are asymmetric despite the symmetric structure
of the game. However, our ﬁndings for the logit-form contest demonstrate
that the owners’ proﬁts are lower when delegating decisions to managers
compared to the non-delegation case. In Schoonbeek (2000) only one player
can delegate his decisions to an agent who receives a fraction of the prize in
case of winning the logit-form contest. The fraction is optimally chosen by the
risk averse principal. In equilibrium, the more risk averse the principal the
higher is the chosen fraction because the principal wants to minimize the risk
of not obtaining the winner prize. Wärneryd (2000) considers delegation in a
logit-form contest where the agent receives an endogenously chosen payment
when winning the contest. The equilibrium of the game is symmetric and
both principals strictly gain from delegation.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the basic model is
5described. In Section 3, we solve the basic two-stage game. Section 4 deals
with merging in contests with strategic delegation. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
We consider a two-stage model with n (n ≥ 2) ﬁrms where each ﬁrm is
characterized by its owner and its manager. All players are risk neutral. On
the ﬁrst stage (compensation stage), each owner i has to decide about an
incentive scheme for his manager i (i =1 ,...,n). Following Fershtman and
Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), it is assumed that owner i chooses a linear
combination of proﬁts (Πi) and sales (Si) as incentive scheme:
Oi = αiΠi +( 1− αi)Si (1)
with αi ≥ 0. As in Fershtman and Judd (1987) the manager’s total compen-
sation package is given by Ai + BiOi (Bi > 0) where Ai and Bi are chosen
by owner i so that the manager’s compensation just equals his reservation
value.3Hence, in the following we only have to care about the managers’ in-
centives. It is assumed that incentive contracts can exclusively be written
on the basis of Πi and Si, but not on other variables that determine prof-
its and sales.4 A c c o r d i n gt oE q . ( 1 ) ,αi < 1( αi > 1) means that owner i
puts a positive (negative) weight on sales whereas αi =1induces pure proﬁt
3Note that the given incentive scheme characterizes all possible contracts that are linear
in proﬁts and sales. Let, e.g., O0
i = xiΠi+yiSi. Hence, Ai+BiO0
i = Ai+BixiΠi+BiyiSi.
By choosing xi = αi/Bi and yi =( 1− αi)/Bi we obtain Eq. (1).
4For example, we can assume that owner i only observes the realizations of Πi+εi and
Si + γi with εi and γi being random variables with E [εi]=E [γi]=0 . As we will see
later, proﬁts and sales directly depend on the resources spent by the managers. Hence,
the last assumption excludes incentive contracts that directly depend on the managers’
resource decisions.
6maximization. Each owner i wants to maximize proﬁts Πi.5
On the second stage (contest stage), each manager i observes all the
chosen incentive schemes.6 After that the managers compete for market
shares by spending resources µi ≥ 0 of ﬁrm i given in monetary terms (e.g.,
promotion expenditures). As in Schmalensee (1976, 1992), for example, this
competition is modelled as a logit-form contest in which S>0 denotes the








ﬁrm i’s share in S depending on the resources spent by all ﬁrms.7 The more
resources manager i spends relative to the other managers the higher will be
ﬁrm i’s market share. Eq. (2) assumes that µi+
P
j6=i µj > 0. Otherwise, let
si =1 /n.A l t o g e t h e r ,Si = si·S describes ﬁrm i’s sales and Πi = Si−µi ﬁrm
i’s proﬁts. Substituting for Si and Πi in Eq. (1) we can rewrite the incentive







S − αiµi. (3)
Therefore, by choosing his incentive variable αi owner i directly inﬂuences his
manager’s cost function on the contest stage. If owner i chooses a low (high)
value for αi he will make the use of the ﬁrm’s resources cheap (expensive) for
his manager which results in a more (less) aggressive behavior of manager i
in the contest. In the next section, we will solve this basic two-stage model
5Remember that each manager always receives his reservation value. Therefore, owner
i maximizes the surplus of ﬁrm i.
6Otherwise, there would be serious problems of delegation working as a self-commitment
device. See Katz (1991) and Bagwell (1995), but also Bonanno (1992) and Kalai and
Fershtman (1997).
7Here, S corresponds to the winner prize of the contest and si to the winning probability
of ﬁrm i. We assume that the power parameter equals one to exclude scale eﬀects when
discussing mergers in Section 4.
7to compare the optimal incentive scheme to the ﬁndings of Fershtman-Judd-
Sklivas. Where possible we will also discuss parallels to the previous literature
on delegation in contests.
3 Delegation in Oligopolistic Contests
We start by considering the game played among the managers on the contest
stage given their respective incentive schemes (3). Manager i’s best reply







S − αiµi (4)
s.t. µi ≥ 0.
Note that the second stage corresponds to an asymmetric contest between
n players with possibly diﬀering marginal costs of resource expenditures as
for instance partially analyzed in Hillman and Riley (1989). We extend
their analysis by not only characterizing the set of managers with positive
contributions but explicitly computing those contributions.




















− αi ≤ 0 if µi =0 . (6)
For all managers choosing strictly positive values for µi we therefore must
have that in equilibrium the ratio αi/
P
j6=i µj must be the same for all




. For all other managers this ratio has




. We solve this (in)equality for µi to
8obtain a manager’s reaction function:

















To ﬁnd an equilibrium we must solve this system of n equalities. A solution
is given in the following result:
Proposition 1 If all incentive variables αi are strictly positive, there exists
a Nash equilibrium on the contest stage with the following properties. There
is a subset H ⊆ {1,..,n} of all managers who spend positive resource levels.
The managers contained in the subset are those that have the m =# H lowest
αi values. The resource expenditure of each manager in the subset is












The managers with the n − m highest αi do not spend any resources. For




αj > (m − 2)αi. (8)
The managers with the two lowest αi always contribute a strictly positive
amount.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The results of Proposition 1 show that only the most aggressive managers
(i.e., the ones with the lowest αi) will choose positive contributions in the
contest whereas the other managers drop out of the market by spending
zero ressources. According to Eq. (7), the owners can directly inﬂuence
the behavior of their managers but also the behavior of the other ﬁrms’
9managers. Especially, by choosing a low value for the incentive variable on
the compensation stage owner i makes his manager more aggressive in the
subsequent contest.
Proposition 1 generalizes a result by Hillman and Riley (1989) who have
only given condition (8) without solving for the equilibrium values of µi.
Note that this result implies a simple algorithm by which a second-stage
equilibrium can be computed. To do this one simply has to sort the incentive
variables αi. Without loss of generality take α1 < α2 < ... < αn.W e
know that the two managers with the lowest αi will always choose positive
resources. Hence, we start oﬀ with the third, checking condition (8) for i =3
and H = {1,2}. If it is met we will continue with i =4and check condition
(8) for H = {1,2,3} and so on, until the condition is violated.
In Proposition 1 we have analyzed equilibria in the contest when all
owners have chosen strictly positive incentive variables on the compensa-
tion stage. It remains to look at situations in which one or more managers
face compensation schemes with a zero incentive variable:
Proposition 2 T h e r ei sn oN a s he q u i l i b r i u mo nt h ec o n t e s ts t a g ew h e nf o r
at least two managers the respective incentive variables αi are zero. If exactly
one manager i has a compensation scheme with αi =0 ,t h e r ei sac o n t i n u u m
of Nash equilibria, in which this manager i chooses a preemptive quantity
µi ≥ S
αk,∀k 6= i, and all other managers j 6= i choose µj =0 .
Proof: To see that no Nash equilibrium will exist if there are two managers
i and j with αi,αj =0just note that given for any (pure or mixed) strategy
of manager i manager j can always be better oﬀ by “overbidding” since the
use of ressources is costless for him.
If only one manager i has αi =0he is indiﬀerent between any quantity
µi given that all other managers stay out and choose µj =0 . On the other
hand, for a given quantity µi by manager i and µk =0for all managers









This condition holds for all j 6= i iﬀ µi ≥ S
αk,∀k 6= i.
Hence, a manager with a very aggressive compensation schedule such that
he is only rewarded for sales but not at all punished for expenditures will
in equilibrium spend at least some resources to preempt any other manager
from entering the contest.
Now we can go back to the ﬁr s ts t a g eo ft h eg a m ew h e r et h eo w n e r s
simultaneously choose the incentive schemes for their respective managers.
First, we restrict the analysis to searching only for symmetric equilibria on
this stage. To characterize the best response by an owner i we ﬁrst have to
compute his proﬁts for given incentive variables set by his competitors. As we
look for a symmetric equilibrium, we have αj is equal to some α for all j 6= i.
We have to check whether there is some α for which indeed choosing αi = α
is a best response of owner i. Note that we can conclude from condition






This condition is clearly met in a symmetric equilibrium. If this condition is
n o tm e tt h eo w n e rm a k e sz e r op r o ﬁts. If it is met, however, we know from (7)
in Proposition 1 that his manager spends the following amount of resources
given that α and αi are strictly positive:
µi =
(n − 1)S ((n − 1)α − (n − 2)αi)
((n − 1)α + αi)
2 . (9)
We can again apply (7) to get for j 6= i that
µj = µ =
(n − 1)Sαi
((n − 1)α + αi)
2. (10)
Using this we derive the following result:
11Proposition 3 There is a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium such that,




n2 − 2n +2
n(n − 1)
. (11)






n(n2 − 2n +2 )
S. (12)





n(n2 − 2n +2 )
. (13)
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 oﬀers some parallels to the ﬁndings of Fershtman and Judd
(1987) and Sklivas (1987) for Cournot competition on the second stage. In
analogy to Cournot competition, strategic delegation in oligopolistic contests
also leads to a symmetric equilibrium where each owner usually puts a pos-
itive weight on sales (i.e., α∗
i < 0) to make his manager more aggressive.
In addition, like in Theorem 4 of Fershtman and Judd (1987) α∗
i → 1 as n
approaches inﬁnity. Hence, similar to the result of Fershtman and Judd for
n →∞we have a perfectly competitive market where each owner chooses
pure proﬁt maximization as incentive scheme and realizes zero proﬁts (see
(13)). Note that α∗
i =1is equivalent to the case of an entrepreneurial ﬁrm
which is managed by the owner himself. In other words, there are not any
strategic advantages from delegation in this situation. On the contrary, each
owner will prefer not to delegate decisions to a manager to save labor costs
since each manager will receive his reservation value as compensation when
being hired. But, in oligopolistic contests according to Eq. (11) owners will
also choose pure proﬁt maximization in case of a duopoly (i.e., n =2 )w h i c h
does not hold for the case of Cournot competition (see Eq. (17) in Fershtman
and Judd 1987, p. 936).
12As mentioned in the introduction, the results of Proposition 3 ﬁtw e l l
with the aggressive behavior of ﬁrms that have entered in recently deregu-
lated markets, like the gas and electricity market and the market for telecom-
munication in Germany and other European countries. There, a few large
corporations use immense expenditures for advertising to obtain large mar-
ket shares relative to each other. This very strong competition can be best
characterized as an oligopolistic contest. Interestingly, our results show that
managerial ﬁrms act very aggressively in oligopolistic contests and the more
aggressively the less competitors participate in the contest (see Eq. (12)).
Analogously, there are also only few large managerial ﬁrms in the deregu-
lated market case. According to Proposition 1, the most aggressive ﬁrms
drive the other ones out of the market. Presumably, this motive also holds
for the aggressive behavior in the deregulated markets. But note that our
model can only partly contribute to the discussion of deregulated markets,
since in the telecommunication case, for example, ﬁrms do not only compete
by advertising but also by prices which can be better discussed within the
Bertrand model. However, price competition can be mimicked by the con-
test model, because lowering product prices is equivalent to invest in future
market shares by increasing µi.
Moreover, we can also compare the results of Proposition 3 to the ﬁnd-
ings of previous papers that have discussed delegation in contests without
using the Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas incentive scheme. In the logit-form con-
test model of Baik and Kim (1997) players exert less resources in the case
of delegation than in the non-delegation case. However, this result clearly
diﬀers from the results of Proposition 3. Without delegation (i.e., αi = α =1
in (9) and (10)), each ﬁrm will choose
ˆ µi =( n − 1)
S
n2 (14)
in oligopolistic contests, but this is strictly less than the resources chosen





n2(n2−2n+2) ≤ 0.T h i s
13result is also intuitively plausible, as in the context of industrial organization
owners want their managers to become more aggressive and not more passive.
The ﬁndings of both the all-pay auction model of Konrad et al. (1999)
and the logit-form contest model of Wärneryd (2000) show that the owners
or principals will strictly gain from delegating. Again, this sharply contrasts
with the results of our model using the Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas incentive
scheme.8 Without delegation the proﬁts of each owner can be computed by




Subtracting the proﬁts in case of delegation, which are described by Eq.
(13), yields ˆ Πi − Π∗
i = n2−3n+2
n2(n2−2n+2)S ≥ 0. Hence, in our model the n owners
are collectively worse oﬀ by delegating decisions to managers. Nevertheless,
the delegation decision is individually rational (given that the manager’s
reservation value is not too large): If all owners but i do not delegate decisions




n − 1 − (n − 2)αi
(αi + n − 1)
2 .




< 1 for n>2.
Therefore, with the exception of the duopoly case owner i will hire a manager
and put a positive weight on sales as a best response if all other owners do
not delegate. Altogether, we have a kind of prisoner’s-dilemma situation
here. For each owner delegating is strictly dominant (given that n>2 and
the manager’s reservation value is not too large), but all owners together will
8This also contrasts with the results for the Cournot model (see Fershtman and Judd
1987, p. 932).
14be better oﬀ if each one does not delegate. Interestingly, in the model of
Wärneryd (2000) there is just the opposite prisoner’s-dilemma situation.9
In Proposition 2 we have seen that if a single owner has decided to make
his manager very aggressive by conditioning his compensation only on sales
and setting the incentive variable αi equal to zero, there will be equilibria on
the contest stage where this manager drives all other ﬁrms out of the market
by supplying at least a certain amount of resources. Now, it is interesting
to consider whether it is possible that in a subgame perfect equilibrium one
owner will indeed on the previous stage be able to set αi equal to zero and
achieve preemption by its management. It is important to note that such an
equilibrium requires that the incentive variables set by those ﬁrms which are
driven out of the market on the second stage must neither be too high nor
too low. If they are too high the preempting owner can proﬁtably deviate
by forgoing complete preemption and choosing a strictly positive incentive
variable. By doing this he may gain a suﬃciently large share of S without
making his manager spend too much resources, and this of course will only
be possible if the competing managers are suﬃciently passive, i.e. their
incentive variables are suﬃciently large. If, however, the incentive variables
of those ﬁrms are too small and, hence, the competing managers are relatively
aggressive, we know from Proposition 2 that preemption requires relatively
large resource expenditures by the preempting manager, which in turn might
make preemption to expensive for the owner. The following result shows that
such equilibria nonetheless exist:
Proposition 4 Preemptive subgame perfect equilibria exist, in which a single
owner i chooses αi =0 . All other owners choose αk = n+1
n .A t s t a g e 2,
manager i spends resources µi = nS
n+1, whereas all managers k 6= i choose
9See Wärneryd (2000), pp. 152-153. However, in the two-principal all-pay auction
model of Konrad et al. (1999) with endogenous delegation decisions we have two asym-
metric equilibria in which one principal delegates and the other not (p. 11).
15µk =0 .
Proof: See the Appendix.
The result of Proposition 4 is surprising. Although the structure of the
t w o - s t a g eg a m ei sc o m p l e t e l ys y m m e t r i c ,a s y m m e t r i ce q u i l i b r i ae x i s ti nw h i c h
one owner i chooses pure sales maximization as incentive scheme for his
manager which makes all the other ﬁrms k 6= i drop out of the contest. In
this case, a sales maximizing manager is rational from owner i’s point of
view as the owner becomes a monopolist in the market. Note that all the
other owners cannot gain by choosing an equally aggressive manager. If these
owners also choose αk =0resources will be costless for all the managers on
the contest stage. This would result into complete escalation where each
manager chooses inﬁnitely many resources and each owner makes inﬁnitely
large losses. Hence, dropping out of the market will be the best response of
the other owners k 6= i to owner i choosing αi =0 .
This ﬁnding clearly diﬀers from the results of Fershtman and Judd (1987)
and Sklivas (1987) for both Cournot and Bertrand competition. There, only
symmetric equilibria exist where either all owners choose a positive or a
negative weight for sales. The ﬁnding also diﬀers from the results of the
previous models on delegation in contests. Baik and Kim (1997) discuss
an asymmetric game and, therefore, ﬁnd asymmetric equilibria. Konrad et
al. (1999) also ﬁnd asymmetric equilibria for a certain parameter range,
but no preemptive equilibria. Wärneryd (2000) exclusively ﬁnds symmetric
equilibria for his symmetric logit-form contest model.
4 Mergers in Oligopolistic Contests
In this section we will only consider the symmetric equilibrium of Proposi-
tion 3. Given a completely symmetric game with homogeneous owners and
homogeneous managers a symmetric out c o m eo ft h eg a m ea p p e a r st ob et h e
16most plausible one. Now, we introduce an additional stage of the game on
which the owners decide about merging. The timing of the game is as follows:
On the ﬁrst stage, the n owners decide about merging. Here, merging means
that the acquired ﬁrms are shut down. This assumption is not critical at all
in this model since we have excluded any scale eﬀects and costs are linear.
Hence, the only eﬀect of merging is weakened competition which would re-
sult in higher proﬁts for the raider.10 As in the basic model, now on stage
2 the remaining owners choose incentive schemes for their managers, and on
stage 3 the managers spend resources in the oligopolistic contest given the
observed incentive schemes of all owners.
Contests are a rather strong form of competition. Therefore, we can
presume that owners have considerable interests in limiting competition by
merging with other ﬁrms. This aspect can be called competition eﬀect.O n
the other hand, merging is not costle s sf o rt h er a i d e ra sh eh a st op a yt h e
owner of the target ﬁrm his foregone proﬁts (cost eﬀect). Thus, we have a
strict trade-oﬀ between competition and cost eﬀect: The more ﬁrms an owner
buys the less competitive is the market but the higher are the payments to
the owners of the ﬁrms that are taken over. In addition, we have to notice
that merging generates positive externalities because each remaining ﬁrm,
not only the raider himself, proﬁts from merging. Interestingly, there are
three recent papers that also deal with mergers in oligopoly in a related
setting. Ziss (2001) and Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat (2001) consider
merging in a Cournot model with strategic delegation, whereas Huck et al.
(2001) discuss mergers in oligopolistic contests without strategic delegation.
We will see that merging in contests with strategic delegation will lead to
diﬀerent results compared to the three mentioned papers.
As a reference case we compare the equilibrium results in the model with
strategic delegation to one where decisions are directly taken by the owners.
10Note that the symmetric equilibrium proﬁts given by Eq. (13) are decreasing in n.
17Let Πr(x) denote the symmetric equilibrium proﬁts from the basic two-stage
game when x ﬁrms compete under the regime r²{D,ND} where D stands
for the case of strategic delegation and ND denotes the non-delegation case.
Hence, if r = D the proﬁtf u n c t i o nΠr(x) will be described by Eq. (13) and
for r = ND by Eq. (15). For example, without merging under regime r each
owner receives proﬁts Πr(n).
Similar to Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat (2001) and Ziss (2001)
we proceed by ﬁrst examining what kind of mergers are proﬁtable before
analyzing equilibria. A merger will be proﬁtable if the proﬁto ft h em e r g e d
entity exceeds the sum of the individual ﬁrms’ proﬁts without the merger.
Alternatively, one could think of a single ﬁrm acquring t ≤ n−1 target ﬁrms
by paying their owners the foregone proﬁts. A merger will be proﬁtable for
an owner if11
Πr(n − t) − tΠr(n) > Πr(n) ⇔
Πr(n − t) > (t +1 ) Πr(n).( 1 6 )
Here, Πr(n−t) describes the raider’s ex-post proﬁts, Πr(n) his ex-ante proﬁts
before merging, and tΠr(n) t h ep a y m e n t st ot h eo w n e r so ft h et a r g e tﬁrms.
As an alternative, one can think of a non-cooperative game where exactly one
owner gets the possibility to make a simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to a
given number of t other ﬁrms before the delegation and competition stage. If
all accept the merger will go along. If a single ﬁrm rejects the oﬀer the whole
merger fails. In this case, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in
which the t ﬁrms are acquired if and only if this condition holds.
The following Proposition compares the proﬁtableness of merging under
both regimes:
11For this condition see also inequality (11) in Ziss (2001), p. 478, and Gonzalez-Maestre
and Lopez-Cunat (2001), p. 1267.
18Proposition 5 (i) Under regime r = D,i fn ≤ 5 all mergers will be prof-
itable. If, however, n>5 there will be a cut-oﬀ value ˆ tD so that acquiring
t ≥ ˆ tD ﬁrms will be proﬁtable whereas the acquisition of t<ˆ tD ﬁr m si sn o t
proﬁtable.
(ii) Under regime r = ND,i fn ≤ 3 all mergers are proﬁtable. If, however,
n>3 there will be a cut-oﬀ value ˆ tND so that acquiring t ≥ ˆ tND ﬁrms will
be proﬁtable whereas the acquisition of t<ˆ tND ﬁr m si sn o tp r o ﬁtable. The
s e to fp r o ﬁtable mergers is larger in the delegation regime (i.e., ˆ tD ≤ ˆ tND).
(iii) In both cases, monopolization by acquiring all ﬁr m sy i e l d st h eh i g h e s t
proﬁts.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 5 shows that monopolization through merging is always prof-
itable under either regime. The results also demonstrate that there is more
merging under the delegation than under the non-delegation regime.
A key intuition to understand Proposition 5 is that there are increasing
returns to scale with respect to the number of acquired ﬁrms t.O nt h eo n e
hand, the expenditures for acquiring t ﬁrms (cost eﬀect) is linearly increasing
in t as all acquired ﬁrms are bought for the same price. On the other hand,
returns to the mergers rise in t at an increasing rate as the proﬁts are split
among less ﬁrms and in addition competition is weakened when more and
more ﬁrms are bought. This is illustrated in Figure 1 which shows the costs of
acquiring t ﬁrms (dotted line) and the proﬁts (solid line) under the delegation
regime (S =1 ,n=1 0 ).
Therefore it becomes clear that if any mergers are proﬁtable then large
mergers are. Note furthermore that a ﬁrm which acquires less than n − 1
ﬁrms delivers a public good to all other market participants. The proﬁts
of all other remaining ﬁrms are identical with the acquiring ﬁrm’s proﬁts.
Hence, this ﬁr mh a st ob e a ra l lc o s t sb u th a st os h a r et h ee n t i r eg a i n s .A s







Figure 1: Competition versus cost eﬀect.
high relative to the gains.
When the market is quite large, it only pays for an owner to buy a lot of
ﬁrms to fully exploit the competition eﬀect. Note that even the cost eﬀect
works in the same direction: As n becomes large, the price for buying another
ﬁrm given by Eq. (13) becomes small, i.e. for a very competitive situation
the foregone proﬁts of the target ﬁrms become negligible.
Next, we can compare the results of Proposition 5 to the ﬁndings of the
previous literature. Huck et al. (2001) only consider the regime r = ND.
Whereas they show that without scale eﬀects acquiring n − 1 ﬁr m si sp r o f -
itable, we have shown the stronger result that without delegation there is a
larger set of proﬁtable mergers even though the public good problem exists.12
Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat (2001) discuss merging in Cournot com-
petition with delegation using a Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas incentive scheme.
They show that — similar to our ﬁndings — given regime r = D there exists a
critical fraction of merged ﬁrms so that merging of more (less) ﬁrms will be
proﬁtable (unproﬁtable).13 Also similar to our model there is more merging
12Compare Proposition 5 in Huck et al. (2001). If scale eﬀects are suﬃciently strong all
mergers will be proﬁtable in their model.
13See Proposition 1 in Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat (2001), p. 1267.
20under the delegation than under the non-delegation regime in the Cournot
model.14
If one ﬁrm has the possibility to acquire all other ﬁrms in the beginning,
it can monopolize the market. As we have shown in claim (iii) of Proposition
5 this is indeed the most proﬁtable strategy in a game, where one ﬁrm can
make simultaneous oﬀers to all others. But from Proposition 4, we know
that there is another way in which monopolization can occur in equilibrium:
If an owner oﬀers his manager a very aggressive incentive scheme, it may be
possible to preempt all other market participants. It is interesting to know
whether monopolization by preemption or by merger leads to higher proﬁts:15
Corollary 1 Under regime r = D, monopolization by merging is more prof-
itable than monopolization by preemption.
Proof: According to Proposition 4, proﬁts from monopolization by preemp-
tion are S− nS
n+1 = S
n+1.B ym e r g i n gw i t hn−1 other ﬁrms an owner’s payoﬀs
are given by
S − (n − 1)
S
n(n2 − 2n +2 )
= S
n3 − 2n2 + n +1
n(n2 − 2n +2 )
.
These payoﬀs will be higher than the payoﬀs from preemption, if
S
n3 − 2n2 + n +1





−2n3 + n2 + n4 +1
(n +1 )n(n2 − 2n +2 )
> 0,
which holds for all n ≥ 2.
At ﬁrst sight, the ﬁnding of the corollary seems to be somewhat surprising.
As the number of payments to the owners of the target ﬁrms increases in n
14See Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat (2001) and Ziss (2001).
15More formally, this can be modelled by allowing one owner ex-ante to choose among
two game forms: one in which the owner can buy all other ﬁrms in the above speciﬁed
way before the game proceeds and another one where he can choose an incentive scheme
as a Stackelberg leader without merging.
21whereas preemption seems to work against 100 and 1,000 ﬁrms in the same
way we would expect that at least for large n monopolization by merging
might be too costly. But a closer look shows that especially for large n
(i.e., for large markets) merging is much more attractive than preemption.
If n increases, the number of payments for the target ﬁrms will also increase
in case of merging, but the magnitude of each payment will decrease much
faster (see Eq. (13)). In addition, preemption is not the same for 100 and
1,000 competing ﬁrms. Proposition 4 shows that the preemptive amount
of resources strictly increases in the number n − 1 of preempted ﬁrms (i.e.,
∂µi/∂n = S/(n +1 )
2 > 0). Therefore, not merging with the whole market
but preemption will be too costly if markets are quite large.
Up to now merging has been exogenously given or resulted from the ac-
quisition proposal by a single ﬁrm. In the next step, we can look for endoge-
nous mergers as equilibrium outcomes when all ﬁrms can simultaneously bid
for others. Following Kamien and Zang (1990) and Gonzalez-Maestre and
L o p e z - C u n a t( 2 0 0 1 ) ,w em o d e lt h em e r g e rg a m ei nt h ef o l l o w i n gw a y :O na










ﬁrms including a bid B
j
j for his own ﬁrm which deﬁnes the owner’s reserva-
tion price. Then, each ﬁrm is allocated to the highest bidder. In case of a
tie among a buyer and a seller, the buyer acquires the ﬁrm. If there is a tie
between two buyers the buyer with the lower index gets the ﬁrm. After the
bidding process the game proceeds as above with a potentially lower number
of ﬁrms. In the delegation regime, each owner of a remaining ﬁrm chooses
a compensation scheme for his manager and in both regimes the contest
takes place among the remaining ﬁrms. Note that all remaining ﬁrms are
technologically identical as we assumed constant returns to scale.
As has been ﬁrst pointed out by Kamien and Zang (1990) it is not clear
that all proﬁtable mergers will take place. Owners might prefer to free-ride
on the merger decisions of other ﬁrms since all ﬁrms that are still active after
22the merging stage of the game will proﬁt from merging. As we will see below,
the acquisition price for a ﬁrm will be higher than Πr(n) as the outside option
of a target ﬁrm is now raised by the free-rider eﬀect.
We proceed by characterizing subgame perfect equilibria of the game for
both regimes. Again following the previous literature we will speak of a
merged subgame perfect equilibrium (or merged SPE)i fa tl e a s to n eo w n e r
has acquired at least one ﬁrm ex post. Following Kamien and Zang and
the subsequent literature on mergers in oligopoly models16 we ﬁr s tg i v ea
necessary condition that must hold for any owner who has bought at least
one ﬁrm in equilibrium. Consider any merged SPE. Let m denote the number
of active ﬁrms after the merging stage. Take any owner who posseses at least
2 ﬁrms in equilibrium. Let q be the number of ﬁrms this owner possesses
in equilibrium (i.e., he has bought t = q − 1 ﬁrms). In this case the total
price such an owner is willing to pay for the acquired ﬁrms cannot exceed the
diﬀerence between his proﬁts Πr(m) with the merger and his proﬁts when he
does not acquire the q − 1 ﬁrms which is given by Πr (m + q − 1).
O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,n o t et h a te a c ho w n e ro fa na c q u i r e dﬁrm has the
option, not to accept an oﬀer by raising his ask price to a suﬃciently high
level. In that case, the number of active ﬁrms would be m +1 . Hence, each
bid for an acquired ﬁrm must be greater or equal than Πr(m +1 ) .T h e nf o r
an owner having q ≥ 2 ﬁrms in equilibrium the following necessary condition
must hold for a merged SPE:
Πr(m) − Πr (m + q − 1) ≥ (q − 1)Πr(m +1 )⇔
Πr(m) − (q − 1)Πr(m +1 ) ≥ Πr(m + q − 1) (17)
with r²{D,ND}.N o t et h a tt h ed i ﬀerence to condition (16) for a proﬁtable
merger refers to the payment to each selling owner. In a merged SPE, this
16See Kamien and Zang (1990), p. 486; Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat (2001), p.
1269; Ziss (2001), p. 481.
23payment will be higher as any owner of an acquired ﬁrm anticipates that if
he does not accept the bid for his own ﬁrm, still other acquisitions will take
place increasing his proﬁts above the proﬁts without any merger.
Condition (17) helps to reduce the number of possible equilibrium out-
comes signiﬁcantly. In a second step, a vector of bids is constructed for
each potential outcome such that indeed such an outcome is sustained in a
subgame perfect equilibrium. The following results can be derived:
Proposition 6 (i) Under regime r = D,i fn ≥ 10, there will be no merged
SPE. If, n ≤ 9, the merged SPE are the following:
a monopoly if n²{2,3,4}
ad u o p o l yi fn²{4,5,6,7,8}
at h r e e - ﬁrm oligopoly if n²{6,7,8,9}
af o u r - ﬁrm oligopoly if n =8 .
(ii) Under regime r = ND,i fn ≥ 5, there will be no merged SPE. If, n ≤ 4,
the merged SPE are the following:
a monopoly if n²{2,3,4}
ad u o p o l yi fn = {3,4}.
(iii) In case of monopoly payoﬀsu n d e rr = D and r = ND are identical.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Comparing Proposition 6 to the results of Proposition 5 shows that not
all proﬁt a b l em e r g e r sa r ep a r to fam e r g e dS P E .E s p e c i a l l y ,f o rt h en o n -
delegation case there are only two types of equilibria. The fact that there is
less merging under the conditions of a simultaneous-bidding equilibrium for
both regimes can be explained by the strictly higher payments for ﬁrms. Here,
each buyer has to pay Πr(m+1)instead of Πr(n) which makes merging less
attractive. But again, under equilibrium conditions there is more merging
under the delegation than under the non-delegation regime. This can be
explained by the fact that for a given number of competitors proﬁts under
24the delegation regime are always lower than under the non-delegation regime.
H e n c e ,t h ep a y m e n t st h a th a v et ob em a d et ot h es e l l i n go w n e r sa r ea l s o
strictly lower under delegation than under non-delegation (i.e., ΠD(m+1)<
ΠND(m+1)) which strongly favors merging in connection with delegation.17
We can also compare our results with the ﬁndings for the Cournot model.
A c c o r d i n gt oP r o p o s i t i o n2i nZ i s s( 2 0 0 1 ,p . 4 8 1 )i nt h eC o u r n o tm o d e l
delegation cannot reduce the set of candidate merged SPE. This also holds
for our contest model. In Proposition 2, Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat
(2001, p. 1270) explicitly derive the merged SPE for the case of delega-
tion in Cournot competition. Comparing their results to the results of our
Proposition 6 under r = D shows that there is more merging in the contest
model. This result ﬁts well with the previous ﬁndings that contests describe
a more competitive situation than the Cournot model. Therefore, the in-
centives to limit competition by merging will be greater in the contest than
in the Cournot model. Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat (2001, p. 1271)
also consider the non-delegation regime for Cournot competition. Similar,
to the contest case delegation increases the set of merged SPE for Cournot
competition, too. But under the given non-delegation regime there will be
again more merging in the contest than in the Cournot model.
The last proposition has shown that there are multiple merged SPE for
a given number of initial ﬁrms. For example, an initial number of eight
ﬁrms may lead to a duopoly, a three-ﬁrm oligopoly, or a four-ﬁrm oligopoly.
However, the number of SPE can be restricted to the most plausible ones by
using the dominance criterion. In analogy to Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-
Cunat (2001, p. 1271) we will use the concept of undominated SPE (USPE)
17Note that this argument does not apply in the same way to the case of proﬁtable
mergers. This is due to the fact that the diﬀerence between proﬁts under r = ND and
r = D is very high for low numbers of competitors but strictly decreases in this number.
Hence, the diﬀerence ΠND(m +1 )− ΠD(m +1 )is more decisive than ΠND(n) − ΠD(n).
25to restrict our attention to those merged SPE, for which — given a certain
number of initial ﬁr m s—t h e r ei sn oo t h e rS P Ew i t hp a y o ﬀst h a ta r eg r e a t e r
or equal for all owners and strictly greater for at least one owner.18 We obtain
the following result:
Proposition 7 For r = D, the set of merged USPE ist the following:
If n =9the three-ﬁrm oligopoly will be the unique USPE.
If n =8or n =5t h ed u o p o l yw i l lb et h eu n i q u eU S P E .
If n =7or n =6the three-ﬁrm oligopoly and the duopoly will be USPE.
For n =2 ,3,4 monopoly is the unique USPE.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The proposition shows that especially merged SPE in form of small oli-
gopolies are merged USPE. Due to the competition eﬀect these oligopolies
are the most attractive ones for the owners. The largest market form that
can be sustained as an USPE is a three-ﬁrm oligopoly. However, for n =9
a three-ﬁrm oligopoly is the unique type of merged USPE because it is the
only SPE type. For n =7and n =6initial ﬁrms, both buyers and sellers
earn more in the duopoly case than in the case of a three-ﬁrm oligopoly. But
in the latter one there are also owners that have neither bought nor sold any
ﬁrm. These owners free-ride on the merging activities of the other ﬁrms and
have very high payoﬀs which are higher than the payoﬀs of certain buyers in
the duopoly case.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Many oligopolistic markets can be best described by a contest model. This
holds for oligopolies in which ﬁrms mainly compete by promotion expen-
ditures, for R & D races, for new markets with network externalities, for
18Note that contrary to Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat (2001) our deﬁnition of
USPE is based on weak dominance.
26recently deregulated markets, and other market situations that are highly
competitive. Our results show that strategic delegation in oligopolistic con-
tests leads to diﬀerent outcomes than delegation in Cournot or Bertrand
competition. Especially, although the market structure is completely sym-
metric there are also asymmetric equilibria in the contest model where one
owner uses a very aggressive incentive scheme for his manager to preempt all
the other ﬁrms.
In a next step, we allow ﬁrms to limit competition by merging prior to
the contest. The results for the merged subgame perfect equilibria show that
there is strictly more merging under contest than under Cournot competi-
tion. This can be explained by the fact that contests characterize a very
strong form of oligopolistic competition. Hence, ﬁrms will also have strong
incentives to limit competition by merging.
The comparison of our results with the ﬁndings of previous contest models
with delegation show that the Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas incentive scheme used
in our model leads to opposite results compared to alternative compensation
forms which are used in the previous contest models. For example, we ﬁnd
a prisoner’s dilemma-like situation where each owner prefers delegation to
non-delegation irrespective of the decisions of the other owners (given that
employing a manager is not too costly), but all owners together are worse oﬀ
in case of delegation compared to non-delegation. However, in other contest
models with delegation there is just the reverse kind of prisoner’s dilemma
situation.
27Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
To show that Proposition 1 indeed describes an equilibrium, we ﬁrst check
that for a manager choosing a strictly positive µi (and thus being an element
of H), (7) satisﬁes condition (5) given that all other managers j ∈ H\{i}


















    



















    


    

2 − αi =0 (18)


















    

= αi (m − 1)




















    




















 − (m − 2)αk






















































































































































































































 = α2 + α3 + α4 + .... + αm
+α1 + α3 + α4 + .. + αm
+α1 + α2 + α4 + ... + αm
+...
+α1 + α2 + α3 + .. + αm−1





































αj − (m − 1)
X
k∈H\{i}
αk = αi (m − 1)
which is clearly always the case. To obtain the condition for positive resource









!2 > 0 (19)
and this is equivalent to the given condition
P
j6=i αj > (m − 2)αi.N o w
consider a diﬀerent manager k with αk < αi. For this manager the left-hand
side is larger (as αk in the sum is replaced by the larger αi)a n dt h er i g h t -
hand side smaller. Hence, manager k will also choose a strictly positive value
30µk. To see that in equilibrium at least the two managers with the two lowest
αi will spend positive amounts, simply note that if the manager with the
second lowest αi does not choose a positive µi the manager with the lowest
αi can always reduce his own resource expenditure and be better oﬀ. Hence,
there is no equilibrium with only one manager spending a positive amount.
There is also no equilibrium where µi =0 , ∀i, as in that case one manager
can deviate and gain S with an arbitrarily small value of µi.
Proof of Proposition 3:





− µi = S
µi
(n − 1)µ + µi
− µi. (20)
By inserting (9) and (10) we get
S
S (n − 1)(α(n − 1) − αi (n − 2))
S (n − 1)(α(n − 1) − αi (n − 2)) + (n − 1)αiS (n − 1)
(21)
−
S (n − 1)(α(n − 1) − αi (n − 2))
(αi + α(n − 1))
2 .
This can be simpliﬁed to obtain
S ((α − 1)(n − 1) + αi)(α(n − 1) − αi (n − 2))
(αi + α(n − 1))
2 (22)
This function is continuous for strictly positive values of α and αi.T a k i n g
the ﬁrst derivative and solving for αi yields a unique candidate for an internal
global maximum:
αi =
(n − 1)α(n − (n − 1)α)
α(n − 1) + n − 2
. (23)
I tc a ne a s i l yb ec h e c k e dt h a tt h eﬁrst derivative of (22) is strictly positive for
αi smaller than (23) and strictly negative for larger αi. Hence, it must be
a global maximum. We still have to check that owner i has no incentive to
deviate and choose αi =0as in this case the proﬁts are no longer given by
(22). From Proposition 2 we know that in this case there is a continuum of
31Nash equilibria in the following contest subgame such that µi is suﬃciently
large. To sustain the symmetric equilibrium we consider here, we simply
have to pick a subgame perfect continuation on the contest stage with µi
large enough to make this deviation unproﬁtable for owner i.
Finally, to obtain the symmetric equilibrium we must have that αi = α
which gives us
α =
n2 − 2n +2
n(n − 1)
.
The resource expenditures in equilibrium can be computed by inserting this
into (9):
µ =
(n − 1)S ((n − 1)α − (n − 2)α)




n(n2 − 2n +2 )
S.






n(n2 − 2n +2 )
.
Proof of Proposition 4:
From Proposition 2 we know that indeed no manager has an incentive to
deviate on stage 2. On stage 1, ﬁrst check that an owner k whose manager
will spend no resources at all on stage 2 cannot gain by choosing a diﬀerent
value for αk.S u c ha no w n e ri si n d i ﬀerent between all strictly positive values
for αk as his ﬁrm is always driven out of the market. Furthermore, choosing
αk =0w o u l dl e a dt oi n ﬁnite losses (see Proposition 2).
It remains to check whether owner i can proﬁtably deviate by choosing
a positive value for αi.W i t h αi =0owner i receives Πi = S − µi. As we
only want to show the existence of preemptive equilibria, it suﬃces to give
an example for the strategies of all other owners such that indeed preemption
by choosing αi =0is the best response of owner i. For simplicity we look
for an equilibrium in which all other owners k 6= i behave symmetrically and
32choose a given value αk > 0. As we have seen in Proposition 2 there will be
a continuum of Nash equilibria on the second stage if αi =0 . A preemptive
equilibrium should be easiest to sustain when the Nash equilibrium played
on the contest stage is the best possible for the preempting owner. That is
t h ec a s ew h e nµi = S





in that case. If we are able to ﬁnd a strictly positive value for αk such that
owner i has no incentive to deviate by choosing a strictly positive value for
αi, we will have a subgame perfect equilibrium. When choosing a positive
value for αi we know from Eq. (23) in the proof of Proposition 3 that owner
i’s best internal response to αk is given by
αi =
(n − 1)αk (n − (n − 1)αk)
αk (n − 1) + n − 2
.
Owner i’s proﬁts in that case can be computed by inserting this value into




(αk (n − 1) − n +2 )
2
αk (n − 1)
.
We have to check, whether there exists a strictly positive value for αk such










(αk (n − 1) − n +2 )
2








(−n + αkn − αk)
2 ≤ 0.
This is true if and only if the term in brackets has value 0, which is equivalent
to αk = n
n−1. Hence, we have indeed found a value for αk such that preemption
can be sustained in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 5:
(i) First, we consider regime r = D. Substituting for ΠD(n) according to
33(13) in (16) gives
S
((n − t)2 − 2(n − t)+2 )( n − t)
− (t +1 )
S
(n2 − 2n +2 )n
> 0 ⇔(24)
−St
n3 − 3tn2 +3 nt2 − t3 − 5n2 +7 nt − 3t2 +6 n − 4t − 2
((t − (n − 1))2 +1 )( n − t)(n2 − 2n +2 )n
> 0.






2 +7 nt − 3t
2 +6 n − 4t − 2 < 0.













−108n2 +1 0 8 n +1 2
p
(12 − 36n +1 1 7 n2 − 174n3 +8 1 n4)
´
.
We have Λ(t) > 0 for t<ˆ tD,a n dΛ(t) < 0 for t>ˆ tD. It can also be checked
that 0 < ˆ tD < 1 for n =5 ,a n d1 < ˆ tD < 2 for n =6 .T h e h i g h e r n the
larger will be the root ˆ tD.A l t o g e t h e r ,f o rn ≤ 5 we have Λ(t) < 0, ∀t ≥ 1,
i.e. merging is always proﬁtable for an owner no matter how much ﬁrms are
taken over. If, on the other hand, n>5 then merging with t<ˆ tD other
ﬁr m sw i l ln o tb ep r o ﬁtable whereas an owner will gain from merging with
t>ˆ tD other ﬁrms.
(ii) Now, we consider regime r = ND. From condition (16) together with
(15) we obtain:
S
(n − t)2 > (t +1 )
S
n2 ⇔− n
2 +2 nt − t
2 +2 n − t>0 (25)
The graph of the left-hand side is a parabola open to the bottom. Hence, it
















Check that the upper root is larger than n, and the lower root is smaller than
n, strictly increasing in n and larger than 1 if and only if n ≥ 2+
√
2 (i.e.
34n ≥ 4). Hence, for n ≤ 3 all mergers are proﬁtable, whereas for n>3 there
is a cut-oﬀ value ˆ tND such that at least ˆ tND ﬁr m sh a v et ob ea c q u i r e df o ra
proﬁtable merger.
To show that there is more merging with delegation we have to check that
(25) implies (24). Replacing k = n − t (25) is equivalent to
S








(n − k +1 )
S
n(k2 − 2k +2 )
.
Hence, we have to show that
k
n
(n − k +1 )
S
n(k2 − 2k +2 )
≥ (n − k +1 )
S
(n2 − 2n +2 )n
⇔ kn(n − k) ≥ 2(n − k).
But the latter is true for n ≥ 2.
(iii) We will show that monopolization is indeed in both cases the most
proﬁtable strategy. We start by examining regime r = D. Monopolization
will yield higher proﬁts than buying less ﬁrms such that k>1 ﬁrms remain
active if revenue S in case of monopolization less the price of buying n − 1
ﬁrms exceeds the revenue with k active ﬁr m sl e s st h ep r i c eo fb u y i n gn − k
ﬁrms:
S − (n − 1)
S
(n2 − 2n +2 )n
>
S
(k2 − 2k +2 )k
− (n − k)
S




















































Hence, monopolization is always the most proﬁtable merger strategy. The
proof for r = ND proceeds analogously. Monopolization will yield the high-
est proﬁts if




k2 − (n − k)
S
n2 ⇔ 1 >
1
k2 +( k − 1)
1
n2.










k2 +( k − 1)
1
n2.
Proof of Proposition 6:
(ii) The proof starts with the simpler case of regime r = ND.U s i n gE q .
(15) the necessary condition (17) can be written as:
S
m2 − (q − 1)
S
(m +1 ) 2 ≥
S
(m + q − 1)2
⇔− S
(q − 1)(m2q2 − q − 3m2q +2 m3q − 2mq − 2m2 + m4 +1− 4m3)
m2 (m +1 )




2 − q − 3m
2q +2 m




First, we consider the necessary condition (26) for the monopoly case m =1





2q − 1 − 3m
2 +2 m
3 − 2m
=( 2 q − 3)m
2 +( m
2 − 1)2m − 1 > 0 for all q ≥ 2 and m>1.
Hence, if (26) does not hold for q =3it will also not hold for any q>3.
Inserting q =3into (26) yields m4+2m3−2m2−6m−2 ≤ 0, which does not
hold for integers m>1. Inserting q =2into (26) gives m4−4m2−4m−1 ≤ 0,
which only holds for m ≤ 2. Altogether, we have two candidates for a merged
SPE: a duopoly with m =2and q ≤ 2, and a monopoly with m =1and
q ≤ 4. Note that there can be no merged SPE in a market with more than
4i n i t i a lﬁrms.
In the next step, we have to check whether there exist equilibrium bids of
the owners on the ﬁrst stage of the game that make the derived duopoly and
monopoly an outcome of a subgame perfect equilibrium. Here, we follow the
36formal structure of Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat (2001), pp. 1276-
1277, without repeating all the details. But the main idea is the following:
After the merging stage, there are three subsets of owners — N0 consisting of
those owners who have zero ﬁrms (the sellers), N1 consisting of those owners
who possess exactly one ﬁrm (owners that have not participated in merging),
N2 consisting of those owners who have at least two ﬁrms (the buyers). In the
bidding process of stage 1, a N0-owner demands a price equal to Πr(m +1 )
for his ﬁrm and makes negative bids for all other ﬁrms, a N1-owner demands
ap r i c ee q u a lt o∞ for his ﬁrm and makes negative bids for all the other ﬁrms,
and a N2-owner demands a price equal to ∞ for his ﬁrm, oﬀers a price equal
to Πr(m+1) to the ﬁrms he want to buy and makes negative bids for the ﬁrms
he does not want to buy. Most of the arguments given by Gonzalez-Maestre
and Lopez-Cunat are independent of the type of competition that follows on
the third stage and, therefore, also hold for our contest model. But we have
to check whether a N2-owner wants to buy less than the predicted number
of q − 1 ﬁrms.19
Now, we come back to our two candidate equilibria above. In the monopoly
case (m =1 ), an owner possesses q = n ≤ 4 ﬁrms ex post. We have to
check whether the monopolist has an incentive to deviate and buy less than
q − 1 ﬁrms. For n =4 , the owner’s payoﬀs in case of monopolization are
S −3ΠND(2)
(15)
= S/4.H ew i l lg a i nf r o mb u y i n gt w oﬁrms instead of three if
ΠND(2)−2ΠND(2) >S / 4, which is not true; he will buy one instead of three
ﬁrms if ΠND(3)−ΠND(2) = (S/9)−(S/4) >S / 4, which is not true either. For
n =3 ,t h eo w n e r ’ sp a y o ﬀs in case of monopolization are S−2ΠND(2) = S/2.
Again, he will not deviate and buy only one instead two ﬁrms, because then
his proﬁts will be ΠND(2) − ΠND(2) = 0.N o t et h a tb u y i n gz e r oi n s t e a do f
q−1 ﬁrms is already precluded by the necessary condition. This also applies
19This part of the proof in Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat (2001), p. 1277, directly
refers to the Cournot model and, therefore, does not apply for our contest model.
37to the duopoly case (m =2 )w i t hq =2so that there is no deviating by
buying zero instead of one ﬁrm. To summarize, the two candidate market
structures do indeed appear as subgame perfect equilibria
(i) Next, regime r = D is considered. Inserting ΠD(·) a c c o r d i n gt oE q .
(13) and, for brevity, using the number of bought ﬁrms t = q − 1 instead of
q the necessary condition (17) can be written as:
S
m(m2 − 2m +2 )
−
tS
(m +1 )( ( m +1 ) 2 − 2(m +1 )+2 )
≥
S
(m + t)((m + t)2 − 2(m + t)+2 )
⇔
−St
(m3 − 2m2 +2 m)t3 +( 9 m2 − 1 − 9m3 − 5m +3 m4)t2
m(m2 − 2m +2 )( m +1 )( m2 +1 )( m + t)
¡
(m − 1)




(2 − 13m4 +1 5 m3 − 13m2 +3 m +3 m5)t
m(m2 − 2m +2 )( m +1 )( m2 +1 )( m + t)
¡
(m − 1)




2m − 2 − 9m3 +3 m2 − 7m5 +9 m4 + m6
m(m2 − 2m +2 )( m +1 )( m2 +1 )( m + t)
¡
(m − 1)
2 +( t − 1)
2 +2 mt




3 +( 9 m
2 − 1 − 9m




4 +1 5 m
3 − 13m
2 +3 m +3 m
5)t (27)






First, we check for a monopoly described by m =1and t = n −1. Inserting
into (27) gives n3−6n2+6n−4 ≤ 0. It can easily be checked that this inequal-
ity only holds for integers n ≤ 4. Hence, we have the same candidate outcome
a si nt h en o n - d e l e g a t i o nc a s ea b o v e . A g a i n ,w eh a v et oc h e c kw h e t h e rt h e
monopolist has an incentive to buy less than n − 1 ﬁrms. For n =4 ,t h e
monopolist’s payoﬀsa r eS − 3ΠD(2)
(13)
= S/4. He will gain from buying two
instead of three ﬁrms if ΠD(2) − 2ΠD(2) >S / 4, which is not true; he will
buy one instead of three ﬁrms if ΠD(3) − ΠD(2) = (S/15) − (S/4) >S / 4,
which is not true either. For n =3 , monopolizing yields S − 2ΠD(2) = S/2.
38If the owner buys only one ﬁrm his proﬁts will be ΠD(2)−ΠD(2) = 0 <S / 2.
Altogether, we have the same merged SPE as under regime r = ND.
It remains to look for further equilibria by checking condition (27) for
m>1.I f m =2 , condition (27) will simplify to −74 − 36t + t2 +4 t3 ≤
0 which holds for integers t ≤ 3.F o r m =3 , (27) can be rewritten as
−455 − 25t +6 5 t2 +1 5 t3 ≤ 0 which is met by integers t ≤ 2.I f m =4 ,
condition (27) will be −1290 + 510t +3 1 5 t2 +4 0 t3 ≤ 0 which only holds for
the integer t =1 . For all other integers m ≥ 5 condition (27) cannot hold.
Hence, besides the monopoly we have three further candidate equilibria that
meet the necessary condition for a merged SPE:
m =2 with t ≤ 3 and therefore 4 ≤ n ≤ 8,
m =3 with t ≤ 2 and therefore 6 ≤ n ≤ 9,
m =4 with t =1and therefore n =8 .
(28)
For any of these cases to be a merged SPE N2-owners must not be interested
to buy τ <tinstead of t ﬁrms. This condition is met if
ΠD(m + t − τ) − τΠD(m +1 )− [ΠD(m) − tΠD(m +1 ) ]≤ 0 ⇔
∆(m,t,τ): =ΠD(m + t − τ) − ΠD(m)+( t − τ)ΠD(m +1 )≤ 0.
Inserting for all the relevant cases given by (28) and computing the values
for ∆(m,t,τ) by using (13) yields: ∆(2,3,2) = − 7
60S, ∆(2,3,1) = − 11
120S,
∆(2,2,1) = − 7
60S,a n d∆(3,2,1) = − 1
60S. Again, buying zero instead of
t ﬁrms is already precluded by the necessary condition. To sum up, the
candidate equilibria described by (28) are indeed merged SPE.
(iii) The proofs for (i) and (ii) have shown that for n =4monopolist’s
payoﬀsw i l lb eS/4 ex post, and for n =3they will be S/2 under either
regime. For n =2and r = D,w eh a v eS − ΠD(2)
(13)
= 3
4S.F o r n =2and
r = ND,w ea l s oo b t a i n3
4S.
Proof of Proposition 7:
39For n =9 , the three-ﬁrm oligopoly is the only merged SPE.
For n =8 ,w eh a v et h r e ec a n d i d a t eU S P E—t h ed u o p o l y ,t h et h r e e - ﬁrm
oligopoly, and the four-ﬁrm oligopoly. Let u+t denote the payoﬀso fa no w n e r
that has bought t other ﬁrms, u− the payoﬀs of an owner who has sold his
ﬁrm, and u0 the payoﬀs of an owner that is neither a buyer nor a seller. For
the duopoly case and n =8 , we only have buyers and sellers. Their respective
payoﬀsa r eu+3 = ΠD(2) − 3ΠD(3) = 0.05S and u− = ΠD(3) = 0.066667S.
I nt h ec a s eo fat h r e e - ﬁrm oligopoly and n =8 , two owners have bought two
other ﬁrms and one owner has bought one other ﬁrm. The respective payoﬀs
are u+2 = ΠD(3)−2ΠD(4) = 0.016667S, u+1 = ΠD(3)−ΠD(4) = 0.041667S,
and u− = ΠD(4) = 0.025S. In the case of a four-ﬁrm oligopoly and n =8 ,
each owner has bought one other ﬁrm: u+ = ΠD(4) − ΠD(5) = 0.013235S
and u− = ΠD(5) = 0.011765S. The comparison shows that the duopoly is
the unique USPE.
Now, we consider the situation with n =7initial ﬁrms. The duopoly
and the three-ﬁrm oligopoly are the only candidate USPE. In the duopoly
case, ﬁve ﬁrms have been acquired; hence, one duopolist has bought three
ﬁrms (u+3 =0 .05S)a n dt h eo t h e ro n et w oﬁrms (u+2 = ΠD(2) − 2ΠD(3) =
0.11667S). The payoﬀs of the selling owner are again u− = ΠD(3) =
0.066667S. In the case of a three-ﬁrm oligopoly, four ﬁrms have been ac-
quired — either two owners have bought two ﬁr m sa n dt h et h i r do w n e rz e r o
ﬁrms, or two owners have bought one ﬁrm and one owner two ﬁrms. The
respective payoﬀsa r eu+2 =0 .016667S, u+1 =0 .041667S, u0 =0 .066667S,
u− =0 .025S. Comparing these values (especially, u+3 =0 .05S and u0 =
0.066667S) shows that both candidates are merged USPE.
For n =6 , again the two possible merged SPE are a duopoly and a three-
ﬁrm oligopoly. In the ﬁrst case, both owners have bought two other ﬁrms, or
one owner has bought three ﬁrms and the other owner only one ﬁrm. In case
of a three-ﬁrm oligopoly, each owner has acquired one ﬁr m ,o ro n eo w n e rh a s
40bought two, the next owner one and the last owner zero ﬁrms. Similar to the
case of seven initial ﬁrms both merged SPE are USPE.
For n =5 , the duopoly is the only merged SPE and, therefore, the unique
merged USPE.
For n =4 , now a monopoly is also a candidate USPE. The respective
payoﬀsa r eu+3 = S − 3ΠD(2) = 0.25S and u− = ΠD(2) = 0.25S.T h eo n l y
alternative equilibrium outcome is a duopoly, where one owner has acquired
two and the other owner zero ﬁrms, or both owners have bought one ﬁrm.
The respective payoﬀs show that the duopoly is (weakly) dominated by the
monopoly.
For n =3and n =2 , the monopoly is the only equilibrium outcome and,
hence, the unique merged USPE.
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